IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus a blank tablet, as is said at On the Soul 3.4.429b30-30a2. The intellect then is an agent by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.

73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion and rest - as it is described in the Physics 2.1.192b20-23 - sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from choice on account of their opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of an agent that is natural in the second way. Thus it is in the proposed case.

74. When the major is proved [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot by a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature -that is, in the whole system of being and beings - to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

75. And if it be objected that that cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from its natural powers, although nature fails less in nobler things, from On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness consisted in a supreme contemplation of the sort to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [On the Soul 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that happiness can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore nature is in this respect made more dignified than if that natural one were posited as the supreme one possible for it; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.

76. What is adduced from the On the Heavens is not relevant to the case, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to the motive power if it is in the stars. And I concede that universally to a thing to which a power is given that is naturally organic, to it is by nature given an organ, I mean in non-defective things. But in the proposed case a power is given but it is not organic; yet not all the other things have been given that, besides the power, concur in an act. From the Philosopher, then, can be there had that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has a power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of the later things required for act it is not so.

77. It can be said otherwise to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in contrast to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in contrast to a received act. The difference between these two is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

78. The minor [n.7] however is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It might also in a third way be easily replied to the minor by denying it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such understanding, not however for this present life. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.

79. To the third reason [n.8] examine the response of Thomas in ST Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2, where he responds thus, that “the diverse nature of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a mathematical middle term, that is, one abstracted from matter (to wit, the conclusion that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term that is considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.”

On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological science about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is clear in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.

80. The said response, however, to the third argument is thus expounded, namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to the habit of science principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) no distinction is drawn through the objects, yet a distinction is drawn through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and thus there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habits; but it is impossible for anything to be distinct from other things under the idea of what is superior but not to be thus distinct under the idea of what is inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct under the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet not distinct under the idea of habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things under the idea of ‘animal’ and not distinct from them under the idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that the principles distinguish the habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if the principles possess some idea of cause that makes distinctions in respect of habits they possess only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that, however much one can posit distinct cognitive habits, yet one does not preserve the need for one of them, as though the knowledge would otherwise be impossible, when one posits the possibility of a second habit that is for any reason distinct.

82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although all objects of speculation are treated of, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to their properties, in the way it was made clear in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion.

83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and thus reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt in the case of immaterial things than in the case of material ones that contradictories are not both true. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being as divided into the ten categories, and that this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises added; but the minors that should be added to them are not now naturally manifest.

On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make assertions about things assumed ‘under’ the terms that are the subjects of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common;     therefore etc     .

86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles ‘all knowable conclusions are virtually included’ [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.

87. This is clear in the reason, because the middle term cannot be the ‘why’ in respect of any property save of one that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle the ‘why’ of any particular property is not included, but only of the most common property; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing anything save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties for which the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle terms, because they do not include them. Therefore there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles.

This is clear in the example, because the statement ‘every whole is greater than its part’, although it includes the statement ‘four is greater than two’, and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: ‘four is double in respect of two’, ‘three is in the relation of one and a half to two’, for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative, yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of the principles;     therefore these predicates are not known of these subjects through the first principles.

89. An objection against this: ‘affirmation or negation about a thing are also both about the same not-thing’; the consequence follows, ‘therefore about this white or nonwhite’, in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject.

I reply that the principle ‘affirmation or negative about a thing’ etc     . is equivalent to the principle ‘one side of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false’, where there are two distributed terms and it is licit to descend under either distributed term to ‘    therefore about this part of this contradiction’ etc     .; but under a predicate that only stands confusedly it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, ‘one side of any contradiction about anything,     therefore this side’. Thus it is in other principles; the predicate of a universal affirmative always only stands confusedly, whether there are two distributed terms there in the subject or one.

And in the proposed example the proposed case is also plain. Just because it is knowable about man that he is capable of laughter, never can more be inferred by the principle ‘one side of any contradiction’ etc     . than that ‘therefore about man he is either capable or not capable of laughter’. One or other part, then, of the predicated disjunction will never be known of the subject by this principle, but some other special principle is required, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing ‘capable of laughter’ determinately of man.